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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

RESTRAINING ORDERS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY
AFTER TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO v. GONZALES

I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence plagues the United States. One in two women in the
United States will experience a violent relationship at some point in her
lifetime. 1 In general, police departments treat domestic violence seriously. 2
Nevertheless, some police departments may refuse to recognize domestic
violence as a criminal matter, or they may assign these reports a lower priority
than other calls. 3 These inadequate responses contribute to the continuing
prevalence of domestic violence. 4 In turn, victim and society both pay a heavy
price. 5
Victims of domestic violence obviously include the women and children
directly assaulted by their abusers. However, society also suffers. 6 Each year
in the United States, abusers cause 18,700 workplace incidents. 7 These
incidents contribute directly to problems of workplace violence. 8 However,

1. Susanne M. Browne, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate
Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1995)
(citing Sarah M. Buel, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence Cases in the United States: An
Overview, in DEFENDING BATTERED WOM EN IN CRIM INAL CASES § A, at 1 (ABA Section of
Criminal Justice & Division for Professional Education eds., 1993)).
2. Mike Hendricks, High Court Deals Out a Low Blow, KAN. CITY STAR, June 29, 2005, at
B1. At least one scholar has questioned the efficacy of this effort. See Johanna NiemiKieslainen, The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Domestic Violence: Differentiating Between Victim
and Perpetrator Response, 12 HASTINGS WOM EN’S L.J. 283, 291-93 (2001). However, in
addition to the procedural shortcomings of the studies cited by Niemi-Kieslainen, the studies
discussed in that article looked only at situations where the officer has discretion to arrest the
perpetrator. Id. at 291-92 (excluding felony arrest situations and situations where the victim
demanded arrest). The studies ignored the effect of arrest in situations where state law mandated
the officer to arrest the perpetrator. See id. at 291. This casenote focuses on those situations
where the officer has no discretion to make an arrest.
3. Browne, supra note 1, at 1298.
4. Id.
5. See Janet Mickish, Domestic Violence: “Make It Your Business” A Huge Success, 33
COLO. LAW. 49 (2004).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
99
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abuse outside of the workplace indirectly cost employers between $3.9 billion
and $7.6 billion in 1995 alone. 9
Abusers usually trap their victims in an escalating pattern of violence. 10
Abusers usually begin abusing their victim with a slap or a shove. 11 The
victim will convince herself that this behavior was abnormal and unlikely to
happen again. 12 The abuser then becomes progressively more violent. 13 T he
abuser claims that the violence is unintentional, and the victim is usually in no
position to contradict that claim. 14
The abuser projects an image to those outside of the relationship designed
to isolate his victim. 15 He will sabotage his victim’s ties to friends and family
in order to socially isolate his victim. 16 Those aware of the abuse will usually
avoid contact with the victim. 17 The isolated victim thus becomes increasingly
dependent on her abuser and unable to leave the situation. 18
Unfortunately, society’s response to domestic violence may help the
abuser trap his victim. 19 Ineffective interventions by friends, police, and the
courts may convince a victim that no one will treat her abuse seriously. 20 Even
if she does manage to leave, the abuser will often cut off his victim’s financial
resources, forcing her to rely on often inadequate public assistance. 21
For the last thirty years, the United States has employed several tactics to
combat the problem of domestic violence. 22 Beginning in the 1970s states
began to fund safe houses and shelters for domestic violence victims. 23 Still,
police departments routinely trained their officers to treat domestic violence
situations as a private matter. 24 Frustrated by this situation, state legislatures
have made several attempts to help victims find protection within the legal
9. Mickish, supra note 5, at 49. These losses can be attributed to lost productivity,
absenteeism, tardiness, health costs, employee turnover, and poor customer service. Id.
10. Browne, supra note 1, at 1295-96.
11. Id. at 1295.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1295-96.
15. Id. at 1296.
16. Browne, supra note 1, at 1296.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1296-97.
20. Id. at 1296.
21. Id. at 1296. The abused, already suffering low self-esteem, may view this move to
public assistance as yet another source of shame. Id.
22. See generally Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST . LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 7 (2004).
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 13. Often, police officers would simply ask the perpetrator to take a walk to cool
down. Id. Officers were told that police intervention would not solve the problem. Id.
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system. First, a majority of states passed laws creating civil protection orders
and changed custody laws. 25 Second, many states passed mandatory arrest
laws. 26 Finally, some prosecuting attorney offices have enacted policies
allowing prosecutors to pursue criminal charges, even where the victim of the
domestic violence has recanted her testimony or has refused to testify against
the abuser. 27

25. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 10. Civil protective orders allowed victims to file for a
protective order by individually petitioning the court. Id. They did not have to rely on police
intervention. Id. Custody law changes occurred when states required courts to consider
allegations of domestic violence when deciding custody disputes. Id. at 13.
26. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT . § 18.65.530(a)(1) (2004) (“a peace officer . . . shall arrest a
person if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has . . . committed domestic
violence . . . .”); ARIZ . REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-3601.B (2000) (The officer “shall arrest” a
domestic violence perpetrator who has inflicted physical injury or used or exhibited a deadly
weapon or dangerous object; in all other cases, the officer “may” arrest the perpetrator.); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2006) (“the officer shall . . . arrest. . .the person without a
warrant . . . whether or not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer.”); KA N .
STAT . ANN. § 22-2307 (1995) (“written policies shall include . . . [a] statement directing that the
officers shall make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a crime is being
committed or has been committed.”); MINN. STAT . ANN. § 518B.01.2(e) (West 2006) (“peace
officer shall arrest without a warrant . . . a person whom the peace officer has probable cause to
believe has violated [a protective] order . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3)(a) (West 2000)
(“shall arrest . . . when he has probable cause to believe that the person has, within twenty-four
(24) hours of the such arrest, knowingly committed . . . an act of domestic violence . . . . ”); N EV.
REV. STAT . § 171.137.1 (2005) (abuser must be arrested if he has committed violence against a
spouse, former spouse, any family member related by blood or marriage, anyone sharing a
residence, anyone in a dating relationship, and co-parents of the abuser’s children); N.H. REV.
STAT . ANN. § 173-B:9.I(a) (2001) (“peace officers shall arrest the defendant” if he or she violates
a protective order); N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West 2005) (victim must claim to be a victim of
domestic violence before the officer must to arrest the perpetrator); N.C. GEN STAT . § 50B-4.1(b)
(2006) (arrest mandated “if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person knowingly
has violated a valid protective order”); OR. REV. STAT . § 133.055(2)(a) (2001) (the officer “shall
arrest” if he has “probable cause to believe that an assault has occurred . . . or to believe that one
such person has placed the other in fear of imminent serious physical injury . . . .”). Not all states
have adopted this approach. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1995) (the officer has discretion
whether or not to arrest, but must make a written report of the alleged incident); FLA. STAT . ANN .
§ 741.29(2) (West 2005) (officer must make a written report, but has discretion to make an
arrest). Some states have found a middle ground. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT . ANN. § 403.7529
(LexisNexis 1999) (officer must arrest a person who violates a restraining order, but if the victim
has no restraining order, then the officer may only arrest the abuser if he has violated some
statute). Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute was the central issue in Town of Castle Rock,
Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
27. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 16. In these situations, law enforcement treats the case like
any other case where the victim is unavailable, such as homicide cases. Id. at 17. The police will
collect physical evidence and witness statements to prove the case, rather than rely on the
victim’s testimony. Id.
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These remedies have not been universally successful. Domestic violence
victims rarely utilize their state’s civil protective order statute. 28 Mandatory
arrest laws have increased police responsiveness to domestic violence, but they
have proven inadequate thus far. 29 Finally, even where prosecutors pursue
charges without the victim’s consent, the victim may see negative
consequences. For example, if a prosecuting attorney’s office pursues a “hard
no-drop” policy, they will require victims to testify regardless of their desire to
do so. 30 In such a situation, the prosecutor may subpoena and even arrest a
victim to compel her to testify. 31 Such a policy may further traumatize the
victim. If the prosecutor adopts a “soft no-drop” policy, the victim may choose
not to testify. 32 In these cases, the lack of victim testimony may cause the
prosecutor to drop the case for lack of good evidence, making the policy
moot. 33
This casenote will examine the effect of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales 34 on domestic violence
victims. This case effectively dispelled, in dicta, any notion that a victim of
domestic violence may sue a police department for violating a state’s
mandatory arrest statute under U.S.C. § 1983, where the victim claimed a
property interest in her restraining order. 35 This casenote suggests that
domestic violence victims may still have a cause of action under an equal
protection claim under § 1983. It then suggests that subjecting police
departments to civil liability under state law when they ignore restraining
orders may be the best option to fight domestic violence.
II. FACTS IN THE GONZALES CASE
On May 21, 1999, Jessica Gonzales requested and received a restraining
order against her husband in conjunction with her divorce proceedings. 36 T he
order, served on Gonzales’s husband on June 4, “commanded him not to
‘molest, or disturb the peace of [respondent] or of any child,’ and to remain

28. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 11. Only 20% of domestic violence victims have sought
protective orders. Id.
29. See id. at 15. For example, in 1990, the District of Columbia police department only
arrested someone on 5% of their domestic violence calls. Id. By 1996, the arrest rate climbed to
41%. Id. Note that despite the 36% increase in responsiveness, the police department still
arrested a perpetrator less than half the time. Id.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 17.
34. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
35. Id. at 2802-03.
36. Id. at 2800.
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100 yards from [Gonzales’s] family home at all times.” 37 The bottom of this
form stated that “IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR RESTRAINED PARTIES
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS” were printed on the reverse
side. 38 The reverse contained the following standard language:
NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS: YOU SHALL USE
EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RETRAINING
ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD BE
IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT
FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE
INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO
VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED
PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
THIS ORDER. 39

On June 4, the state trial court made this restraining order permanent. 40
On June 22, at around 5:00 p.m. or 5:30 p.m., Gonzales’s husband
kidnapped the children (aged 10, 9, and 7) while they were playing outside
Gonzales’s home. 41 He had not arranged for this visit. 42 At 7:30 p.m.,
Gonzales called the Castle Rock, Colorado Police Department, suspecting that
her husband had taken the children. 43 When officers responded, she showed
them a copy of the restraining order and asked that they return her children to
her immediately. 44 The officers told her that they could do nothing. 45 They
told her to call the police again if the children were still gone by 10:00 p.m. 46
At 8:30 p.m., Gonzales talked to her husband on his cellular phone. 47 He
told her that he had the children at a Denver amusement park. 48 Gonzales
called the police again, asking them to check the amusement park for her

37. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2800-01 (citing Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 366
F.3d 1093, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004)).
38. Id. at 2801 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801. The order also allowed Mr. Gonzales to see his children
on alternate weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and “‘upon reasonable notice,’ for a
mid-week dinner visit ‘arranged by the parties.’” Id. The order also allowed him to visit the
home for such “parenting time.” Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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husband’s vehicle and to put out an “[all points bulletin]” for her husband. 49
The officer on the line refused, telling her to wait until 10:00 p.m. to see if her
husband returned. 50
Gonzales followed these directions, calling the police yet again at 10:10
p.m. when her husband failed to return the children. 51 This time, the police
department told her to wait until midnight before calling again. 52 Again,
Gonzales followed orders and called at midnight. 53 At 12:10 a.m., Gonzales
went to her husband’s apartment and called the police a fifth time when she
found that nobody was present. 54 Police told Gonzales to wait for police to
arrive, but (perhaps tired of waiting on the police) she went to the police
station to file an incident report at 12:50 a.m. 55 The police officer who took
the incident report made absolutely no effort to enforce the restraining order;
instead, he took his dinner break. 56
Finally, Gonzales’s husband forced the police to react. At 3:20 a.m., he
arrived at the police station and opened fire with a semiautomatic weapon. 57
Police returned fire, killing him. 58 Inside of his truck, police found the dead
bodies of Gonzales’s three daughters. 59 Mr. Gonzales had already murdered
his three children. 60
Gonzales sued the Town of Castle Rock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that the town violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution because the police department “had ‘an
official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of
restraining order violations’ and ‘tolerate[d] the non-enforcement of restraining
orders by its police officers.’” 61 Gonzales further alleged that the town acted
“willfully, recklessly, or with such gross negligence as to indicate wanton
disregard and deliberate indifference to” her civil rights. 62 The district court
granted the town’s motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801-02.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
Id.
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Circuit reversed, finding that Gonzales had alleged a cognizable procedural
due process claim. 63
At the time of filing, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the validity
of a due process claim in a domestic violence situation. 64 Because Colorado
was one of fifteen states mandating arrest for domestic violence offenses and
one of nineteen states mandating arrest for violating domestic restraining
orders, 65 this case provided an opportunity for the Court to recognize § 1983 as
a powerful tool in the fight against domestic violence. Instead, the Court’s
opinion narrowed the list of possible legal solutions for domestic violence
victims.
III. HISTORY
The Gonzales case turned on whether Gonzales had a property interest in
the restraining order against her husband. 66 In order to have a property interest
in such a benefit, one must have “more than a unilateral expectation of it.
[One] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 67 The
hallmark of this property “is an individual entitlement grounded in state law,
which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’” 68 For example, a creditor has
such an interest in a deceased person’s estate with an unpaid bill. 69 State law
may create such a right to public education. 70 A statute granting an operating
license revocable only “for cause” creates such an interest. 71 However, if the
statute grants wide discretion to revoke such a license, the licensee has no
property interest. 72 To tell the difference, a court should look to the extent to
which the statute uses mandatory language. 73

63. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. The Tenth Circuit found that the repeated use of the word
“shall” made enforcement of the protective order statute mandatory on police officers. See
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2002).
64. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2803 (“As the Court of Appeals recognized, we left a similar
question unanswered in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs . . .”).
65. Id. at 2817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2803-04.
67. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
68. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982). Once a court finds this
characteristic, “the types of interests protected as ‘property’ are varied and, as often as not,
intangible, relating ‘to the whole domain of social and economic fact.’” Id.
69. Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988). However, such a
property interest only protects the holder against state action, not private action. Id.
70. Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2006). However, such a right does
not necessarily continue when the individual is incarcerated. Id. at 71.
71. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1164-65.
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TO THE

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
no state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” 74 Due process of the law originally secured English citizens
“against the arbitrary action of the crown.” 75 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits
anyone from acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, or any State” from depriving or causing to deprive any person of the
United States of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” This statute “deter[s] state actors from using the badge
of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and
to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” 76
In Board of Regents v. Roth 77 an assistant professor brought suit against his
employer, Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh, because the university did not
rehire him when his faculty appointment expired after one year. 78 Under
Wisconsin law at that time, a first year teacher was entitled to nothing more
than a one year appointment. 79 Instead, state law left the decision of whether
to rehire a first year teacher to the “unfettered discretion” of university
officials. 80 The Court recognized that due process in property rights extends
“beyond mere ownership in real estate, chattels, or money.” 81 Property
interests may take many forms. 82 However, in order to have a property interest
in a benefit, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 83 “It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.” 84 Property
interests are not created by the Constitution. 85 Instead, they are created by
rules or understandings stemming from state law. 86 The Court found that the
plaintiff’s appointment for one year was to terminate, with absolutely no
74. U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1.
75. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 518 (1885).
76. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57
(1978)).
77. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 567.
81. Id. at 571-72 (citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
82. Id. at 576.
83. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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provision for renewal whatsoever. 87 Thus, he had no interest in reemployment once his term expired. 88
Six years after Roth, the Supreme Court decided Memphis Light, Gas and
Water Division v. Craft. 89 In Craft, a homeowner in Memphis, Tennessee,
sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages against a municipal
utility, claiming that the utility company terminated the homeowner’s services
without due process of the law. 90 The district court concluded that the
homeowner’s entitlement to continued utility service did not implicate a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 The court of
appeals reversed in part. 92 The Supreme Court held that, although the
underlying substantive property interest is created by state law, “federal
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” 93
Here, Tennessee state law did not allow a public utility to terminate service “at
will.” 94 The availability of causes of action to enjoin a wrongful threat or
recover damages shows that Tennessee recognized the plaintiffs’ claims as a
protected interest. 95 Because the Fourteenth Amendment protects more than
undisputed ownership, the plaintiffs asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement,
even though their claims of wrongful termination were disputed. 96
In Craft, the Court held that the state must hold some kind of hearing
before depriving someone of his property interests. 97 To determine what kind
of hearing is required, the state must weigh three factors: 1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action,” 2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and 3) “the
government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and the
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would
entail.” 98 The utility violated plaintiff’s due process rights because it failed to
provide the plaintiff with notice reasonably calculated to alert the plaintiff to
an administrative procedure to consider the complaint, and it failed to actually
consider the plaintiff’s complaints. 99
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
Id.
436 U.S. 1 (1978).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Craft, 436 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 22.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

108

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:99

In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Servi ces, 100 the
mother of a 4-year-old boy severely beaten and permanently injured by his
father brought suit against the local Department of Social Services. 101 The
mother claimed, after the state court awarded custody to the child’s father, that
state authorities ignored strong evidence that the boy’s father severely abused
him. 102 Over the course of eighteen months, the agency received numerous
reports of abuse from a local hospital because the boy kept receiving
suspicious injuries. 103 Furthermore, the boy’s father would not follow the
voluntary agreement by which the agency agreed to keep the boy in his
mother’s custody. 104 Finally, after twenty-six months, the boy’s father beat his
son so badly that he fell into a life-threatening coma. 105 While the boy
survived, he suffered brain damage so severe that he will spend the rest of his
life in an institution for the profoundly retarded. 106
The boy’s mother brought a § 1983 claim against the local agency and
several of its employees. 107 The district court granted summary judgment for
the agency. 108 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Due Process
Clause does not require a state or local governmental entity to protect its
citizens from “private violence, or other mishaps not attributable to the conduct
of its employees.” 109 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to
resolve a split between circuits on this issue. 110
The Court did not address the issue of whether the child protection statute
entitled the boy to receive protective services in the terms of the statute
because she did not properly preserve the issue. 111 The Court noted that the
plaintiff relied on the substantive, not the procedural, component of the Due
Process Clause. 112 The Court expressly held that “nothing in the language of
the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” 113 The Clause
limits the state’s power to act; it does not guarantee a minimal level of safety

100. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
101. Id. at 191.
102. Id. at 193.
103. Id. at 192-93.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 193.
106. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 193-94 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d
298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)).
110. Id. at 194.
111. Id. at 195 n.2.
112. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
113. Id.
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and security. 114 The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to protect the
people from the state, not to coerce the state to protect people from each
other. 115 Thus, due process cases generally recognize no right to governmental
aid, even where that aid “may be necessary to secure the life, liberty, or
property interests which the government itself may not deprive from the
individual.” 116 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the state
created a special relationship such that the state acquired an affirmative duty,
enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to protect the boy in a reasonably
competent fashion. 117 The Court held that only when a state takes a person
into custody and holds him there against his will does the state owe a duty to
assume responsibility for his safety and general well-being. 118 The rationale is
simple: when the state takes affirmative action to deprive a person of the
ability to care for himself, it must in return offer basic human needs. 119 The
Court did not address the basic weakness in the Government’s analysis: that
the state, through its family court system, assigned custody of the boy to his
father, limiting the ability of the boy to care for himself. 120 The Court noted
that the plaintiff may have a claim under tort law, outside of the Due Process
Clause. 121
Where a state does deprive a citizen of liberty, a policy must contain
“explicitly mandatory language” before it creates a liberty interest. 122 In
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,123 state regulations allowed
prison officials to deny visitation where a “visitor’s presence in the institution
would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution’s security or
interfere with [its] orderly operation.” 124 The Court held that this regulation
lacked the necessary mandatory language to create a liberty interest for the
institution’s inmates. 125

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191-203.
Id. at 201-02.
Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
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V. DISCUSSION
A. The Gonzales Decision
In response to Castle Rock’s failure to enforce her restraining order,
Gonzales filed a § 1983 suit against the Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, and
against three individual police officers. 126 Defendants filed a Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; the district court granted this
motion before defendants answered the complaint. 127 The district court held
that, regardless of whether Gonzales was relying on the procedural or
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, she had failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted. 128
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the
individual officers as defendants. 129 However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court’s dismissal of the case against the City of Castle Rock. 130 The
Tenth Circuit originally found that Gonzales failed to show that the city had
violated any of her substantive due process rights when its police department
failed to respond to her complaints. 131 However, on a rehearing en banc, the
Tenth Circuit held that Gonzales had a protected procedural due process right
because she had a property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her
restraining order. 132 The Tenth Circuit then found that Gonzales had
sufficiently alleged that the town could have deprived her of her due process
rights because the town failed to hear or seriously entertain her request to
enforce the restraining order and protect her interests in it. 133 The Tenth
Circuit then reversed the district Court and remanded the case for further
hearings. 134

126. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 & n.3 (2005).
Gonzales claimed that the town failed to properly train the officers to respond to domestic
violence calls. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002).
127. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2802 n.3. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in
their actions as police officers. Id.
130. Id.
131. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1263. Gonzales never claimed to have a special relationship with
the police department which would entitle her to such a claim. Id. at 1262. Gonzales also failed
to show affirmative action (as opposed to mere inaction) by the police department which actually
created a danger. Id. at 1263.
132. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
133. Id. The appellate court did not find that the city had violated her procedural due process
rights as a matter of law; it only stated that Gonzales was entitled to prove her case. Id.
134. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1267. The Tenth Circuit left open the questions of whether
Gonzales could establish municipal liability or if Castle Rock was entitled to qualified immunity.
Id. at 1266-67.
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B. Scalia’s Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for seven Justices, delivered the majority opinion of
the Court. 135 Scalia pointed out that the Court in DeShaney left open a
question similar to the one posed by Gonzales: whether a statute which
provided for specific services entitled the recipient of those services to
protection under the Due Process Clause. 136 The Court held that the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect all
“benefits.” 137 Instead, a person “clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire . . . . He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it.” 138
The Court based its decision on a state law determination, not a Due
Process Clause analysis. 139 In a due process analysis, a court will first look to
see if a state statute has provided the plaintiff with a property interest. 140 T he
court will then ask if that property interest is sufficient enough to warrant
protection under the Due Process Clause. 141 Such entitlements are created by
state law, not the Constitution. 142 The Court held that a benefit is not a
protected entitlement if officials have discretion to grant or deny it. 143
On the state law issue, the Court refused to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s
holding. The Tenth Circuit held that the statute created an entitlement to
enforcement where a “‘court issued restraining order . . . specifically dictated
that its terms must be enforced’ . . . and a ‘state statute command[ed]’
enforcement of the order when certain objective conditions were met.” 144 T he
presumption that the Court should defer to a federal court as to the law of the
state within its jurisdiction was not appropriate here because the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion “did not draw upon a deep well of state-specific
expertise.” 145 The Tenth Circuit opinion relied only on language from the
restraining order, the statutory text, and a state legislative hearing transcript. 146
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit relied on decisions from Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Oregon, and Tennessee, not Colorado. 147 Finally, the Court
135. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2800.
136. Id. at 2803 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 n.2 (1989)).
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
139. Id. at 2804.
140. Id.
141. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804.
142. Id. at 2803.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 366 F.3d 1093,
1101 (10th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 2804.
146. Id.
147. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804.
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reasoned that if it were to accept the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, the Court
would be faced with conclusively deciding a federal constitutional question:
whether such an entitlement constituted property under the Due Process
Clause. 148 The Court decided to take the less drastic step of ruling on the state
law issue. 149
The Court ultimately found that the critical language in determining
whether Gonzales had an interest in the restraining order existed in the
restraining order statute, not the actual restraining order itself. 150 At the time
of the incident, the Colorado statute stated that:
(a) A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining
order.
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impracticable under
the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the
peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a
protection order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the
protection order or . . . has received actual notice of the existence and
substance of such order.
(c) In making the probable cause determination . . . a peace officer shall
assume that the information received from the registry is accurate. A peace
officer shall enforce a valid protection order whether or not there is a record of
the protection order in the registry. 151

One lawmaker stated that, “[t]he entire criminal justice system must act in a
consistent manner, which does not now occur. The police must make probable
cause arrests.” 152 Still, the Court did not find that this statute made
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory because of a long history of
police discretion and the understanding that language in such statutes cannot be
read literally. 153 A true mandate of police action would require language
stronger than “‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order’
(or even ‘shall arrest . . . or . . . seek a warrant’).” 154 In situations such as

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2804-05.
151. COLO. REV. STAT . § 18-6-803.5(3) (1999) (emphases added).
152. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 n.6 (quoting Tr. of Colo. House Judiciary Hearings on H.
B. 1253, Feb. 15, 1994) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 2805-06.
154. Id. at 2806.
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these, where the suspected violator is not present and his whereabouts are
unknown, the necessity for discretion is particularly apparent. 155
The Court addressed the arguments raised by the two dissenting Justices.
While the dissent points out that some states have found their domestic
violence mandatory arrest statutes to be more mandatory than traditional
mandatory arrest statutes, the dissent fails to clarify how the mandatory arrest
provision applies in situations where the offender is not present to be
arrested. 156 There will be some situations where an arrest is not possible, such
as when the offender is not home. 157 Nor does Gonzales specify the precise
means by which the police are mandated to act in this situation: arrest the
husband, seek an arrest warrant for the husband, or have them use “every
reasonable means, up to and including arrest,” to enforce the order. 158 If the
mandate is for seeking a warrant, this is an entitlement to procedure, not
adequate enough to support standing in a § 1983 case. 159
Finally, even if the Colorado statute did make police action mandatory, this
would not have necessarily given Gonzales an entitlement to enforcement of
the restraining order. 160 Making state actions mandatory may serve legitimate
purposes other than to confer a benefit on an individual or a class of people. 161
Again addressing concerns raised by the dissenting Justices, the Court
noted that Gonzales did not claim any contractual right to enforcement of the
statute. 162 Instead, the statute specifically gave Gonzales the power to initiate
contempt proceedings against her husband in a civil action or to request a
prosecuting attorney to initiate contempt proceedings if the order was issued in
a criminal action. 163
Although the Court did not base its decision on a Due Process Clause
analysis, 164 it did find in dicta that even if Colorado law did confer an
entitlement to Gonzales, this entitlement would not necessarily have been
property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 165 The Court did not defer to
the Tenth Circuit on whether this entitlement constitutes a property interest for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 166 Instead, the Court held that federal
constitutional law determines whether an interest rises to a property interest

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
Id. at 2807.
Id. at 2807.
Id. at 2808.
Id.
Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2808.
Id. at 2809.
Id. at 2804.
Id. at 2809.
Id. at 2803.
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protected by the Due Process Clause. 167 The right claimed by Gonzales did
not resemble traditional property rights. 168 Here, the property interest would
arise incidentally, not out of some unique government service, but out of a
function that government actors have always performed: arresting people they
have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense. 169 While
Gonzales may have had a private right to contract with a third party for her
protection, she would not have had the power to arrest her husband. 170 Nor
would she have the power to obtain an arrest warrant on her own. 171
The Court distinguished “indirect” benefits from “direct” benefits. 172
Withdrawal of direct benefits, such as financial payments under Medicaid for
medical services, triggers protection of the Due Process Clause, 173 while
withdrawal of indirect benefits does not deprive a person of any interest in life,
liberty, or property. 174 The Court concluded that “[t]he benefit that a third
party may receive from having someone arrested generally does not trigger
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor its
‘substantive’” components.175 Ultimately, the Court recommended that states
may provide victims with enforceable remedies under state law. 176
C. Souter’s Concurrence
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority of the
Court. 177 Justice Souter agreed with the majority that Gonzales had not shown
a violation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 178 Courts
generally grant police discretion not to enforce the law. 179 In comparison, no
one could argue that Gonzales had the power to order the police not to arrest
her husband. 180 Gonzales’s argument was unconventional because she claimed
federal procedural protection under a state law benefit, which is itself
procedural. 181 Justice Souter pointed out that “[t]he Due Process Clause
extends procedural protection to guard against . . . deprivation[s] . . . of
167. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9
(1978)).
168. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2809 n.12.
171. Id..
172. Id. at 2810.
173. Id.
174. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2810.
177. Id. at 2811 (Souter, J., concurring).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2811.
181. Id.
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substantive state law property rights[,] . . . [b]ut Gonzales claim[ed] a property
interest in a state-mandated process in and of itself.” 182 Due process is not an
end in itself; instead, it is designed to protect substantive interests. 183 In
distinguishing substance and procedure, Justice Souter stated that “[p]roperty
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation.” 184 “State
rules of executive procedure . . . may be nothing more than rules of executive
procedure.” 185 Thus, property rights are distinguishable from the procedural
obligations imposed to protect them. 186 Gonzales sought to change the scope
of federal due process by replacing federal process for state process. 187
Gonzales could not distinguish between the object of her entitlement and the
process she sought to protect it. 188 Accepting Gonzales’s argument would
“federalize every mandatory state-law direction to executive officers whose
performance on the job can be vitally significant to individuals affected by
it.” 189
D. Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. 190 They framed the
issue more narrowly than the “far-ranging” arguments of the parties and their
amici. 191 They framed the issue as whether the restraining order entered by the
trial court created a property interest protected from arbitrary deprivation by
the Due Process Clause. 192
Justice Stevens stated that it was clear that neither the Constitution nor any
federal statute granted Gonzales or her children any entitlement to police
protection. 193 Neither did any Colorado statute presumptively create such an
entitlement for an ordinary citizen. 194 However, Gonzales could easily have
entered into a contract with a private security company to provide
protection. 195 Gonzales’s interest in such a contract would certainly constitute
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 196 Thus, if Colorado
performed the functional equivalent by granting Gonzales an entitlement to
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring).
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2812.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2812-13 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2813.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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mandatory individual protection by her local police, that right would also
qualify as property entitled to Due Process Clause protection. 197 Gonzales’s
allegations that local police ignored her request to enforce the restraining order
provide her with a § 1983 remedy against that police force, even if Colorado
law does not provide specifically for such a private cause of action. 198 Stevens
asserted, “The central question in this case is therefore whether, as a matter of
Colorado law, respondent had a right to police assistance comparable to the
right she would have possessed to any other service the government or a
private firm might have undertaken to provide.” 199
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for failing to defer this question to a
more “qualified tribunal[]” and for ignoring its own “settled practice.” 200 T he
old policy, he said, is more efficient, and this policy reflects the belief that state
district courts and appellate courts are more familiar and more able to interpret
the laws of their respective states. 201 Only in rare occasions has the Court
declined to show this deference. 202 A court could plausibly read “‘shall use
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order;’ and ‘shall arrest’” 203 as
mandatory; the majority clearly did not show that such a reading is “clearly
wrong.” 204
Justice Stevens recommended certifying the question to the Colorado
Supreme Court. 205 This was because “[p]rinciples of federalism and comity
favor giving Colorado’s high court the opportunity to answer important
questions of state law.” 206 By certifying a dispositive state law issue, the Court
could rely on its wise policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of difficult
questions of constitutional law. 207 Finally, certification would promote judicial
economy and fairness for all parties. 208 Justice Stevens observed that the
Colorado Supreme Court could overturn the United State Supreme Court and
hold that the statute did provide Gonzales with a property interest in the
enforcement of the restraining order. 209
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT . § 18-6-803.5(3)(a)-(b) (1999)) (emphasis added in
original).
204. Id. Here, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have reviewed the Tenth Circuit’s
holding on the state law issue under an abuse of discretion standard, not a de novo standard. Id.
Under this level of review, the Tenth Circuit’s holding is not clearly erroneous. Id.
205. Id. at 2815.
206. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2815 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2815-2816.
208. Id. at 2816.
209. Id.
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Justice Stevens then turned to the majority’s “rather superficial analysis of
the merits.” 210 The Court placed undue weight on other statutes seemingly
mandating police enforcement, but the result was to preserve police
discretion. 211 By doing so, the Court has “‘give[n] short shrift’ to the unique
case of ‘mandatory arrest’ provisions in domestic violence” statutes. 212 Many
states have passed these statutes in the last twenty-five years with the
“‘unmistakable goal’ of eliminating police discretion in this area.” 213 The
Court’s formalistic analysis also failed to take into account that the statute was
designed to protect a narrow class of persons, beneficiaries of these restraining
orders. 214 Finally, “a citizen’s property interest in a commitment to provide
police enforcement in specific circumstances is ‘just as concrete and worthy of
protection’ as her interest in any other important service which the government
or a private firm has undertaken to provide.” 215
Colorado passed this statute along with several other states in an effort to
eradicate police underenforcement in domestic violence cases by mandating
arrests. 216 In response to police departments viewing domestic violence as a
private matter and consequently assigning them lower priority status, many
states followed the example of the Minneapolis police department by
mandating arrest when an officer has probable cause to believe that a domestic
assault has occurred or that someone has violated a protection order. 217 The
purpose of these statutes was to remove police discretion. 218 Thus, it is hard to
imagine what the Court had in mind when it requested “some stronger
indication from the Colorado Legislature.” 219 The majority’s opinion is
especially brazen, given the trend in many states to interpret their statutes as
eliminating police discretion. 220
The majority called for Gonzales to describe the “precise means of
enforcement,” but this question is a “red herring.” 221 The statute specifically
requires either an arrest or an arrest warrant. 222 The crucial point is not
whether the enforcement in the case was an arrest or an arrest warrant (as the
answer to this question probably changed through the night as Gonzales gave
more information about her husband’s whereabouts); it is that “[the police]
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2818.
Id. at 2818-19.
Id. at 2819.
Id.
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lacked the discretion to do nothing.” 223 For example, if a state required the
provision of healthcare if a person met certain income requirements, no one
could say that person lacked entitlement to that healthcare because the form of
that entitlement will change depending on the situation. 224
Importantly, Gonzales was entitled to enforcement of the restraining order
because she received the individual benefit from a state court under a state
statute benefiting a narrow class of people. 225 She specifically applied for the
restraining order, and the state judge found a risk of “irreparable injury” and
“physical or emotional harm” if the husband were to return to the Gonzales
home. 226 Because the statute only operates when a judge grants an identified
individual its benefits, the majority’s finding that the statute provides
“incidental” or “indirect” benefits misses the mark. 227 “[D]omestic restraining
order statutes ‘identify with precision when, to whom, and under what
circumstances police protection must be afforded.’” 228
Because Colorado law clearly eliminates police discretion, Gonzales has
demonstrated the “legitimate claim of entitlement” of enforcement required to
show a Due Process Clause property right. 229 Clearly, property interests
extend beyond “mere ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.” 230 The
Court has previously found property interests in several state-conferred
benefits and services, including disability benefits, public education, utility
services, government employment, and some state procedures, such as fair
procedures before a driver’s license may be revoked pending the adjudication
of an accident claim. 231 It is the purpose of property “to protect those claims
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined.” 232 Here, Colorado guaranteed Gonzales the protection of
enforcement of the restraining order, a promise on which she relied. 233
At the very least, the Due Process Clause requires that the relevant state
decision-maker listen to the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in

223. Id. at 2819-20 (emphasis in original).
224. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2821.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2822.
228. Id. (quoting Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 143 (Or. 1983) (en banc)).
229. Id.
230. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2822 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
231. Id. at 2822-23 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. V. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1972)).
232. Id. at 2823 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
233. Id.
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reaching his decision. 234 Here, the police ignored Gonzales’s complaints. 235
The police had a “callous policy of failing to properly respond” to similar
violations. 236 The police department provided Gonzales with nothing more
than a “sham or a pretense” of process. 237
VI. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
The Court based its decision on a determination of state law. 238
Consequently, a Colorado state court could overturn the U.S. Supreme Court
on the issue of whether or not Gonzales had a property interest in seeing her
restraining order enforced. 239 The Court found that in statutory interpretation,
“shall” does not apply to police officers like it does to other government
officials. 240 The Court’s reasoning here confused discretion in how to meet the
requirements of the statute with whether to meet the requirements of the
statute. 241 Justice Stevens pointed this out in his dissent when he stated that,
under the Colorado statute, the police lacked discretion to do nothing. 242 T he
Court’s holding here may not be universally upheld in all state courts with
similar mandatory arrest provisions. 243
The Court went further in dicta to say that, even if Gonzales did have a
property interest in the restraining order, it did not meet the kind of “legitimate
expectation” that would prevent the state from removing such a benefit without
the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 The Court’s
distinction between direct and indirect rights initially seems convincing. 245
However, this analysis did not address the holding in Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 246 which stated that property interests are, “often as not,”

234. Id. at 2824.
235. Id.
236. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 2825.
238. Id. at 2804 .
239. Cf. id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens points out that the Court should
have certified this question of law for a Colorado state court, regardless of whether the parties
sought such certification. Id. at 2815-2816.
240. Id. at 2806 (majority opinion). The Court acknowledged the legislative history of the
statute, which included a statement that the criminal justice system was not acting in a uniform
manner, and that this statute required police to make probable cause arrests. Id. at 2805 n.6.
241. Id. at 2805-06. The Court found that because police may have discretion to actually
make an arrest, or merely seek an arrest warrant, then the statute gave the police some discretion.
Id.
242. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Many states already interpret such statutes as eliminating police discretion. Id. at 281819 (pointing to a trend in many states).
244. Id. at 2809.
245. See id. at 2810.
246. 455 U.S. at 430.
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intangible. Such property interests often encompass the “whole domain of
social and economic fact.” 247 By quickly dispensing of Gonzales’s property
claim by labeling the benefit “indirect,” the Court may have seriously limited
the rights of many citizens, not just those claiming an interest in a restraining
order. 248
In addition, the Court probably erred by even deciding the state law issue
of whether the statute gave Gonzales a property interest in seeing the
restraining order enforced. From a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court
will have wasted its time if the Colorado Supreme Court disagrees with the
majority’s state law analysis. 249 From a legal standpoint, the Court failed to
convincingly outline its reasons for refusing to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s
determination on this issue. 250
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion is more convincing. Justice Souter
points out that Gonzales attempted to claim a property right through a
procedural rule. 251 Souter claimed that Gonzales could not distinguish
between the object of her entitlement and the process she sought to protect
it. 252
However, this may not necessarily be the case. Here, one could view the
“object of her entitlement” as the guarantee that her abuser will be arrested if
he violates the restraining order. At first glance, this may appear to be
identical to the process she claims she was denied. Yet, the Court’s majority
opinion contained the answer to this argument when it claimed that the statute
granted the officer discretion in how to make every “reasonable effort” 253 to
enforce the restraining order under the statute. The Colorado statute required
more than just a mere arrest. 254 It mandated that the officer use “every
reasonable means” to enforce Gonzales’ restraining order. 255 Thus, Gonzales’s

247. Id.
248. For example the Court has held that a creditor has a protected property interest in
recovering an unpaid debt from the estate of a debtor. Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1987). Under the Court’s analysis, such a benefit may be called
“indirect” because facilitating claims between creditors and debtors is not a unique government
service, but a function that courts have always performed. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
Similarly the Second Circuit has held that a public education is a protected property interest for
non-incarcerated individuals where state statute provides for such an education for 16-21 year
olds. Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 352-355 (2006). Under the Court’s analysis, this
public education may be considered an “indirect” benefit unworthy of protection because states
have traditionally provided public education to all of its citizens. Id.
249. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2815-16 & nn.3-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 2814.
251. Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring).
252. Id.
253. COLO. REV. STAT . § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2005).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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property right was for the police department to enforce her restraining order.
The process by which this right is protected is the officer’s method of
enforcing the restraining order. 256 By denying Gonzales a police response, the
police department deprived Gonzales of her property interest protection under
the statute and the restraining order.
Despite the limitations of the majority and concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens’s dissent probably relies on the wrong legal theories to answer those
arguments. Justice Stevens analogizes Gonzales’s interest in her restraining
order to the property interest she would have had in a contract with a private
security company to provide protection. 257 This analogy fails to distinguish
between a contract, where two parties enter an agreement, and a statutory
provision which merely provides unilateral protection to a specific group of
citizens. 258 By framing the issue around this argument, 259 the dissenting
Justices base their arguments on a mere analogy, rather than a clear,
identifiable right. Such an approach may actually expand property interests
protected by the Due Process Clause beyond a comfortable limit. 260
In sum, the Court should have recognized that Gonzales had a property
interest in seeing the restraining order enforced. She did not have such a right
because it is analogous to a contractual right. Instead, Gonzales had a
legitimate expectation that when her legislature mandated that police “shall”
use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order, including arrest, the
legislature never intended the word “shall” to mean “may.” The Court should
have recognized this property interest as legitimate enough to warrant Due
Process Clause protections.
Nevertheless, seven Justices agreed with the Court’s decision in
Gonzales. 261 Lower federal courts will most likely follow the Court’s dicta
that Gonzales did not state a claim under § 1983. Victims should not rest on an
argument that this part of the opinion was mere dicta.
This casenote examines ways that domestic violence victims and society in
general can combat domestic violence after the Gonzales decision. The first
question is whether society should develop legal procedures to protect victims.
256. The officer has no discretion on whether to arrest the perpetrator if the perpetrator is
present. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He does have discretion in how to
seek the arrest warrant. Id. at 2805. Here, the officer has clerical discretion: what information to
include in the arrest warrant application, for example. Id.
257. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 2803-05. Furthermore, Gonzales never claimed anything like a contractual
right to enforcement of the statute. Id. at 2803. Gonzales retained the independent right to
initiate contempt proceedings against her husband if he violated the restraining order. Id. at 2805.
259. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Cf. id. at 2803 (A person “clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire . . . .
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))).
261. Id. at 2800.
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If society agrees that legal remedies are necessary, the next question is what
kind of legal remedies will be most effective. This casenote suggests that civil
liability for police departments that fail to respond vigorously to domestic
violence calls may be a vital piece of the puzzle necessary to effectively
combat domestic violence in the United States.
A. Should Society Develop Legal Remedies for Domestic Violence Victims?
Some scholars have argued that legal remedies may not be the best
approach to deal with the problem of domestic violence. 262 Reasons for this
vary. 263 To some extent, the legal system may penalize those women who
honestly want to stay with their abusers. 264 In addition, legal proceedings can
be costly, possibly forcing the victim to forgo other non-legal services. 265
Legal involvement can also incite more violence from the abuser, as he
attempts to punish such independent behavior. 266 The legal system will
usually not respond to “mere” verbal, emotional, or economic abuse. 267
Nevertheless, the legal system plays a vital role in the lives of women who
seek protection from their abusers. Family members and social service
agencies cannot threaten an abuser with jail time or civil penalties for his
abusive behavior. The inability of the legal system to serve the needs of all
women in domestic violence situations is no excuse to abandon all efforts at
developing legal options for those women who have turned to the legal system
for relief. 268 For those women who have called on the legal system for
protection, the legal system must not arbitrarily turn a blind eye or ignore its
duties to answer that call.
B. What Kind of Legal Remedies Will Be Most Effective?
Legislative remedies for domestic violence may be proactive or reactive.
An example of proactive policy is the creation of the Office on Violence

262. See Goodmark, supra note 22, at 19-23.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 19-21. One could certainly argue to what extent a woman would want to stay w ith
her abuser. Actually measuring the frequency of women who would stay would be very difficult;
a researcher would have to devise a way to distinguish honest answers from coerced answers.
Nevertheless, this casenote concedes that it is at least possible that some women would want to
stay.
265. Id. at 22.
266. Id. at 23.
267. Id. at 29-30.
268. By analogy courts do not abandon their efforts at contract law because some parties may
wish to stay in unenforceable contracts for non-legal reasons (e.g., maintaining a good business
relationship with a big client). See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., COM M ERCIAL
T RANSACTIONS: A SYSTEM S APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2003). Similarly, lack of legal remedies is no
reason to abandon contract law. Cf. id. at 5-6.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

RESTRAININ G ORDERS AN D LAW ENFORCEMENT

123

Against Women (OVW) in the U.S. Department of Justice in 1995. 269 Since
1995, the OVW has handed out about $2 billion in grant funds to state law
enforcement agencies throughout the United States. 270 In addition, President
George W. Bush has announced a program for the creation of fifteen domestic
violence victim service and support centers throughout the United States. 271
These centers promise to consolidate all of the social service, criminal justice,
economic, and spiritual needs of their clients. 272 While these centers are a
promising development, their effects are unknown. Society should continue to
develop more effective alternative solutions.
Many states have also enacted proactive mandatory arrest laws. 273 T hese
laws have enhanced the arrest rates on domestic violence calls in their
respective jurisdictions. 274 These laws have two drawbacks. First, where they
impose no civil liability, police departments may not necessarily respect the
statute. This was probably the case in Castle Rock, Colorado. Consequently,
police departments are left only with political consequences for failing to act.
While this may be a powerful deterrent if the department fears a high-publicity
case, such as Gonzales, it will not guarantee that a police department will
respond to every domestic violence call it receives. Second, even where the
arrest rates may climb, police departments may still fail to respond adequately
enough. 275
Civil protection orders are another proactive attempt to combat domestic
violence. 276 Protection orders allow an abuse victim to employ the legal system
to prevent her abuser from harassing her. 277 However, to be effective, such
restraining orders must be enforced. This requires police to arrest abusers
when they violate protection orders. Where, as in Gonzales, police refuse to
enforce such restraining orders, they become nothing more than a paper shield,
providing the victim with no protection whatsoever.

269. See Office on Violence Against Women, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/
overview.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
270. Id.
271. Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at the Opening of the St. Louis Family Justice Center,
(Jan. 12, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_
060112.html.). The President has funded these centers with $20 million. Id. As of January 12,
2006, six centers have opened in Oakland, San Antonio, St. Louis, and Brooklyn. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra note 26.
274. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEM INISM 3,
14 (1999) (In the District of Columbia, arrest rates rose from 5% to 41% from 1991 to 1996.)
275. See id. (even after improvement, D.C. police arrested a perpetrator less than half the
time).
276. See Goodmark, supra note 22, at 10.
277. Id.
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Finally, revised custody statutes may help domestic violence victims when
they share a child with their abuser. 278 A revised custody statute may require a
court to consider allegations of domestic violence when determining a custody
arrangement. 279 This may sometimes prevent attempts by the abuser to use
custody of children as yet another tool for controlling his victim. 280 Still, these
laws will not work where evidence of domestic violence is weak. Nor will
they protect a childless victim.
In summary, society has taken many proactive steps to combat domestic
violence. In addition to non-legal remedies, such as social services, family,
and friends, 281 state and federal lawmakers have provided for massive funding
of domestic violence prevention programs. 282 Lawmakers have required
mandatory arrest of perpetrators, and they have revised civil laws to provide
more tools for victims of domestic violence. 283 Still, domestic violence
persists. A more reactive approach in our legal system may supplement the
proactive policies in eradicating domestic violence.
One reactive approach may already exist: a woman might successfully sue
a police department that has ignored her protection order under a claim that the
police department failed to provide her with equal protection under the law. 284
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state
may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 285 Women seeking protection from gender bias in public housing have
successfully brought lawsuits under this theory. 286 If one views gender bias in
public housing and domestic violence in the home as two points along a
spectrum of violence against women, this further supports an argument for an
equal protection claim in cases like Gonzales. 287
In order to support an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove that: 1)
inadequate police response to domestic violence calls is gender discrimination,

278. Id. at 12.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 9.
282. See Office on Violence Against Women, supra note 268.
283. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 15, 10.
284. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-16. Gonzales may have erred in failing to bring a
claim under this theory. Nevertheless, one could see why Gonzales relied on a due process claim
rather than an equal protection claim. By claiming violation of due process, Gonzales avoided the
burden of proving discriminatory intent.
285. U.S. CONST . amend. XIV., § 1.
286. See, e.g., Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1985 WL 13505 *1 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
The tenant had refused to pose nude for the landlord or to have sex with the landlord. Id. The
court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act because the act
recognizes sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination. Id.
287. Cf. Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home Is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic
Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST . LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004).
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and 2) the police intentionally discriminated against victims of domestic
violence based on gender. 288 The first element should be easy to prove
because virtually all victims of domestic violence are female. 289 “In fact, the
history of profound gender inequality in the government’s treatment of wifebeating makes the problem one of core constitutional concern.” 290 A plaintiff
may show discriminatory intent by demonstrating that the lack of
responsiveness is based on stereotypical notions of gender roles or unconscious
sexism. 291
Still, equal protection claims may not be universally successful. First, the
Supreme Court repeatedly ruled against allowing civil rights claims under §
1983 to impose liability on municipalities where the municipality has failed to
act. 292 Second, equal protection claims may be hard to prove. 293 In an equal
protection claim, the plaintiff carries the extra burden of proving that police
responses to domestic violence calls actually constitute gender
discrimination. 294
In addition, the plaintiff must prove intent to
discriminate. 295
If equal protection claims will not work to encourage police to enforce
protection orders, then perhaps state legislatures can enact legislation that will
motivate police departments by creating financial consequences for failing to
respond to domestic violence calls. Indeed, in Gonzales the Court explicitly
recommends this approach as a way of putting teeth into mandated arrest
statutes. 296 Under this approach, a legislature has two options: 1) provide for
reductions in a police department’s budget when it fails to respond to domestic
violence calls, or 2) provide victims of domestic violence a state cause of
action when a police department ignores a protection order.
The first option has several benefits but many limitations. The first benefit
is that legislatures could re-emphasize any proactive spending policies to
prevent domestic violence. 297 Where spending provisions for domestic
288. Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-15. The plaintiff would base her theory on the fact that,
because domestic violence victims are predominantly female, police inaction in these cases
provide females with less protection against assault and battery laws than the police provide
males from these crimes. Id. at 1315.
289. Id. at 1316.
290. Joan Meier, Battered Justice for Battered Women, WASH. POST , March 22, 2005, at A
25.
291. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1315.
292. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193
(1989), and Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803-04 (2005).
293. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-1315.
294. Id. at 1314.
295. Id. at 1315.
296. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
297. See Office of Violence Against Women, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
fy2004grants/welcome.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). This map provides links to spending
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violence programs could easily get lost amongst the various other law
enforcement spending programs, a penalty provision might draw the attention
of policy-makers. 298 The second benefit is that a legislature should be able to
accurately predict costs so as to pressure police departments without crippling
them financially.
Nevertheless, the drawbacks of such a program are numerous. First, a state
legislature or executive oversight committee may not have a strong motivation
to carefully scrutinize a police department’s practices. Such scrutiny may
whither under political pressure to provide robust funding to police
departments, and it may lead to arbitrary decisions. Also, this kind of program
could lead to significant oversight costs.
In comparison, a private cause of action overcomes these limitations. Any
problems inherit in a private cause of action can be overcome by placing limits
on these causes of action. Where a political body may not have a strong
motivation to carefully examine a police department for limitations, a domestic
violence victim will have strong incentives to challenge a police department
that has ignored her protection order. By subjecting such claims to the
procedures of a civil trial, this approach should be less susceptible to arbitrary
outcomes. It will also be open to the public. The plaintiff will bear the burden
of investigating the police department’s actions, not the state. 299
Still, this program would have several limitations. First, unpredictable jury
verdicts could run the risk of crippling police departments, especially if the
plaintiff seeks and receives punitive damages. The legislature could correct
this by prohibiting punitive damages. 300 Moreover, the substantial burdens of
actually proving that the police department’s actions actually caused the
plaintiff’s harm and proving exactly what harms that failure caused should
serve as an inherent limitation on the number of suits filed against police
departments. This statute could also lead to significant litigation costs for
police departments. A legislature could correct this by providing that court and
legal fees be paid by the plaintiff in frivolous cases. The largest hurdle for this
type of program would most likely be unpredictability in police budgets.
However, a legislature could prevent this by capping the damages allowed.
Further, local police departments could share the risk of such lawsuits by
purchasing insurance. In some situations, municipalities would be too risky to
insure. However, this would actually further encourage lagging police
programs in each of the fifty states. Id. Budget expenditures include provisions for homeland
security, bullet proof vests, drug training, and other programs. Id.
298. Cf. id.
299. Court fees may add to the cost of this program, but the legislature could provide that the
losing party in such a case carry this burden.
300. Many states already provide for limited recoveries from municipalities. See, e.g., 745
ILL. COM P. STAT . 10/2-102 (2002) (prohibiting collection of punitive damages from local
government).
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departments to develop strong domestic violence policies and enforce those
policies uniformly.
Some states have already allowed for civil liability in these situations. 301
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have refused to impose municipal liability
without specific legislative action. 302 As more states implement these policies,
domestic violence advocates will get a better idea of which policies are more
effective in combating domestic violence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to give Gonzales a fair shot at convincing a trial court that her
police department deprived her of her due process rights when they failed to
enforce her restraining order. Instead, the Court denied Gonzales’ claim,
cutting off one legal avenue of recourse for domestic violence victims.
Still, domestic violence victims and society have several options remaining
to combat domestic violence. Victims and advocates must always be aware of
non-legal resources, such as counseling, social services, family, and friends.
They must also be aware of the legal options currently available. These
include civil restraining orders, mandatory arrest laws, revised custody laws,
and funding for police departments to fight domestic violence. Where poor
police response to domestic violence calls limits the efficacy of these legal
remedies, victims have two options. Currently, they may bring an equal
protection claim against a police department that fails to enforce their
protection order. However, victims and advocates should consider asking their
legislators to provide for a private cause of action against those same police
departments. A cause of action created under a specific state statute will
provide more concrete protection to victims who have been harmed by the
failures of law enforcement to act. That protection would arise from the strong
motivation to pursue domestic violence calls vigorously and uniformly.
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301. Such legislation is already in effect in Montana and Tennessee. Learn from Tragedy:
Protective Orders Need More Force, DAYTON NEWS-J OURNAL, July 5, 2005, at A4.
302. See generally Jennifer Dieringer & Carolyn Grose, Judicial Deference or Bad Law: Why
Massachusetts Courts Will Not Impose Municipal Liability for Failure to Enforce Restraining
Orders, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 557 (2005).
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